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An Efficient Secure Message Transmission in 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks using Enhanced 
Homomorphic Encryption Scheme 
Gorti VNKV Subba Rao α & Dr. Garimella Uma σ 
Abstract - In MANETs the nodes are capable of roaming 
independently. The node with inadequate physical protection 
can be easily captured, compromised and hijacked. Due to 
this huge dependency's on the nodes, there are more security 
problems. Therefore the nodes in the network must be 
prepared to work in a mode that trusts no peer. In this paper 
we look at the current scheme to transmit the data in MANETs. 
We then propose a new scheme for secure transmission of 
message in MANETs as Alternative scheme for DF’s new Ph 
and DF’s additive and multiplicative PH. Here we also provide 
the computational cost of the homomorphic encryption 
schemes. We also provide the implementation issues of our 
new scheme in MANETs. For the entire message to be 
recoverd by the attacker, the attacker needs to compromise 
atleast g nodes, one node from each group g and know the 
encryption keys to decrypt the message. The success rate of 
our proposed new scheme is 100% if there are more number 
of active paths in each group of the network. 
I. Gorti’s-Enhanced Homomorphic 
Cryptosystem (EHC) 
new Enhanced homomorphic Cryptosystem 
(EHC) for homomorphic Encryption / Decryption 
with IND-CCA secure. Homomorphic encryption 
schemes allow operations to be performed on the 
encrypted data as if the operations are performed on the 
plaintext. Homomorphic encryption has numerous 
applications in real time. The computer will perform the 
computation on the encrypted data, hence without 
knowing anything of its real value. Finally, it will send 
back the result, and that will be decrypted. For 
coherence, the decrypted result has to be equal to the 
intended computed value if performed on the original 
data. For this reason, the encryption scheme has to 
present a particular structure [23].By keeping the all the 
industry demands we proposed new scheme exhibit 
better performance than existing schemes mainly in 
processing speed, memory and power consumption. 
Our scheme is a non deterministic and exhibits addition, 
multiplication, mixed addition and mixed multiplication 
operations. Our Construction. A large prime number ‘p’, 
another prime number ‘q’ such that q < p are taken and 
a random number ‘r’ has taken to make the scheme non  
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deterministic. Consider the set of clear text data Zp and 
the set of clear text operations {+, -,*, / and mixed} 
consisting respectively, of the addition, subtraction, 
multiplication and mixed multiplication modulo m, with 
m= pq. Let the cipher text data set be Zc. Define the 
encryption key k = (p, q,m,r) and Ek(X)=)(mod m). 
Decryption will be done with the secret key k = ( p ), 
X=Dk (Y ) = C mod p. But can be broken if p can be 
discovered but which is a very tough to solve. A 
computer can factor that number fairly quickly, but 
(although there are some tricks) it basically does it by 
trying most of the possible combinations. One can find 
two huge prime numbers, p and q that have 200 or may 
be 400 digits each. Q will be kept secret (It is secret 
key), and by multiplying them together to make a 
number m = pq. That number m is also a secret key to 
encrypt the data. It is relatively easy to get m by 
multiplying p and q. But if anybody know m, it is 
basically impossible to find p and q . To get them, you 
need to factor m, which seems to be an incredibly 
difficult problem finding the ‘ r ’ also difficult as this value 
will be generated randomly. it is generally regarded that 
m should be at least 1024, if not 2048. 
a) Operations Encryption/Decryption of EHC Scheme 
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Secretkeygen() 
Chose large prime number ‘ p ‘ and another 
prime number ‘ q ‘ 
Calculate m = p * q 
Generate a random number ‘ r ‘. 
r,q and m Kept secret.       Secret values  r,q and
m     Shared key  :  p     
Encryption                                         
Encrypt(X,m,p,q,r) 
Assume  X € Zp    
Compute (mod m)      
Output Y € Zc
Decryption                                         
Decrypt(Y,p) 
input  Y € Zc 
compute X = Y mod p        output  X € Zp
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Y = (X + r*p
q
)
In order to see that the scheme above 
deciphers correctly it is necessary to prove that 
decryption really outputs the original message M. 
Proof : Encrypt the message X 
                        E(X) = )(mod m) 
Cipher text Y will be (X+rp) 
                        Decrypt Y = X = Y mod p 
= (X+rp) mod p 
= rp mod p + X mod p 
= X Plaintext 
b) Security of the Encryption Scheme 
We can support strongly our scheme is more 
secure when compare to existing schemes as follows : 
1. Our scheme is very strong as it uses the secret keys 
q, m and r and sharing key p for encryption. So it is 
very difficult to find the secret keys. 
2. Our scheme only shares the shared key p only 
between the sender and receiver so it is very difficult 
to find the q and r. 
3. Random number ‘r’ will be generated randomly so 
that every time the same plaintext mapped to 
different cipher text so that it is very tough to track 
the plain text even with strong observation for 
opponent. 
4. Opponent cannot get the secret value and random 
number. 
5. Our scheme supports Addition, Multiplication, Mixed 
addition and Mixed multiplication. 
6. As we are taking large prime number p the 
decryption circle will be more so that second 
multiplication also possible. 
7. Is IND-CCA secured scheme which will be proved in 
the next section. 
8. It is very faster than the existing schemes and 
consumes less power and memory. 
c) Non deterministic feature which enhances the 
security 
The random number ‘r’ gives the feature non 
deterministic means the plaintext will be converted into 
different cipher text with the change in the value r. We 
can better understand using the following example. 
Let p=11 q=7 r=2 x1=5 x2=3 then m=77 
cipher text Y1= 27 cipher text Y2= 25. 
Now by changing the random number the same 
plain text will be mapped to another cipher texts Let 
p=11 q=7 r=4 x1=5 x2=3 then m=77 cipher text Y1= 
49 cipher text Y2= 47. 
II. Introduction to MANETs 
Mobile Ad-hoc network (MANETs) is a set of 
wireless devices called wireless nodes, which 
dynamically connect and transfer information. By 
definition, MANETs differentiate themselves from 
existing networks by the fact that they rely on no fixed 
infrastructure [Zhou and Haas 1999]: the network has no 
base stations, access points, remote servers, etc. 
Wireless nodes can be personal computers 
(desktops/laptops) with wireless LAN cards, Personal 
Digital Assistants (PDA), or other types of wireless or 
mobile communication devices. Figure 1.1 illustrates 
what MANET is. In general, a wireless node can be any 
computing equipment that employs the air as the 
transmission medium. As shown, the wireless node may 
be physically attached to a person, a vehicle, or an 
airplane, to enable wireless communication among 
them. 
Technically and architecture wise if we see the 
MANETs environment consists of mobile nodes that 
communicate directly with each other in a peer to peer 
way. Mobile nodes that join together in on movement 
and they create a network on their own and each these 
node performs the basic operations like routing and 
packet forwarding without the help of an established 
infrastructure. All the available nodes can join together in 
the network and carry out network operation. Due to this 
huge dependency's on the each other nodes it is 
obvious to have more security problems. Other angle if 
we observe in MANETs, the nodes are capable of 
roaming independently so that the node with inadequate 
physical protection can be easily captured, may 
compromise and hijacked. Therefore the nodes in the 
network must be prepared to work in a mode that trusts 
no peer [12, 13].  
Security is an important area for MANETS, 
especially for those comes under security-sensitive 
applications. To provide security in MANETs, we 
consider the following attributes: availability, 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation.[81] Mobile ad hoc networks are self 
configurable and autonomous systems, comprising of 
nodes, which are able to move and organize themselves 
arbitrarily without any infrastructure [1]. Without the 
support of infrastructure, it is very difficult to distinguish 
the insider and outsider nodes of the mobile ad hoc 
networks. Since the mobile adhoc network environment 
is defined in a unique way, by features such as 
frequently changing network topology, vulnerable 
wireless links, storage limitations, and constraints in 
computational and transmission aspects [2]. Due to the 
above-mentioned properties of MANETs, the inclusion 
and implementation of security infrastructure has been a 
real challenge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 : Overview of Mobile Ad-hoc Network 
An Efficient Secure Message Transmission in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks using Enhanced Homomorphic 
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In MANET, a wireless node can be the source, 
the destination, or an intermediate node of data 
transmission. When a wireless node plays the role of 
intermediate node, it serves as a router that can receive 
and forward data packets to its neighbor closer to the 
destination node. Due to the nature of an ad-hoc 
network, wireless nodes tend to keep moving rather than 
stay still. Therefore the network topology changes from 
time to time. 
Wireless ad-hoc network have many 
advantages: 
−
 
Low Cost of Deployment
 
:
 
Ad hoc
 
networks can be 
deployed on the
 
fly; hence no expensive
 
infrastructure such as copper
 
wires or data cables is 
required.
 
−
 
Fast Deployment
 
:
 
Ad hoc
 
networks are very 
convenient and
 
easy to deploy since there are no
 
cables involved. Deployment
 
time is shortened.
 
−
 
Dynamic Configuration
 
: Ad hoc
 
network 
configuration can
 
change dynamically over time.
 
When compared to
 
configurability of LANs, it is
 
very 
easy to change the network
 
topology of a wireless 
network.
  
MANET has various potential
 
applications. 
Some typical examples
 
include emergency search-
rescue
 
operations, meeting events, conferences,
 
and 
battlefield communication between
 
moving vehicles 
and/or soldiers. With
 
the abilities to meet the new 
demand of
 
mobile computation, the MANET has a
 
very 
bright future
 
in MANET, provision of secure
 
communication protocol should satisfy
 
the following 
security requirements [7,
 
8, 9].
 
1.
 
Mutual Authentication
 
: Ensures the
 
authenticity of 
communicating nodes
 
mutually.
 
2.
 
Confidentiality
 
: Ensures the secrecy
 
of the 
message content is known only
 
between the 
authenticated
 
communicating nodes (or users).
 
3.
 
Data Integrity
 
:
 
Ensures the receiver,
 
that the 
received message is intact.
 
4.
 
Non–Repudiation
 
: Ensures the
 
origin of the 
message cannot deny
 
having sent the message.
 
5.
 
Non–Impersonation
 
:
 
Ensures
 
unauthorized users 
cannot pretend to be
 
an authorized one to do 
malfunction.
 
Proposed novel protocol
 
achieves the
 
above security requirements and also
 
requires less 
computational power due to
 
the deployment of 
elliptic curve
 
cryptography and minimum 
transmission
 
overhead due to less number of
 
handshaking messages.
 
First we will discuss in detail the
 
existing 
security solutions available for
 
MANETs. Then we 
propose a new
 
scheme for secure transmission of
 
message in MANETs as an alternative
 
for threshold 
cryptography (TC).
 
 
 
III. Literature Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) can be 
defined as a collection of large number of mobile nodes 
that uses temporary network from existing network 
infrastructure or central point. Each node participating in 
the network acts as host/a router and must forward to 
packets for other nodes. MANETs are completely 
different from other network because of their 
characteristics such as: self organizing capability, node 
mobility, provides large number of degree of freedom 
and dynamic topology. As mobile ad hoc networks edge 
closer toward wide-spread deployment, security issues 
have became a central concern and are increasingly 
important. 
In fact, ad hoc networks cannot be used in 
practice if they are not secure, for example, in 
applications like emergency rescue and battlefield 
communication; if no security mechanism is used, an 
adversary can easily thwart the network establishment. 
Due to their inefficiency, asymmetric/public key 
cryptosystems, for example RSA, are unsuitable for ad 
hoc networks where there are constraints on 
computation and energy [10]. In fact, symmetric key 
systems, like DES, AES and keyed hash functions, are 
still the major tools for communication privacy and data 
authenticity in most networks. To provide secure 
communication for any group of nodes using symmetric 
key cryptography, these nodes need to share a 
common secret key1 By definition [30], an ad hoc 
network is peer-to-peer and does not rely on any fixed 
infrastructure. 
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) [1] is a 
collection of wireless mobile nodes that form a 
temporary network on the fly that operates without the 
support of any fixed network infrastructure. MANETs are 
created dynamically and they provide special 
challenges beyond those in standard data networks [2]. 
Some examples of the possible uses of ad hoc 
networking [3],[4] include students using laptop 
computers to participate in an interactive lecture, 
business associates sharing information during a 
meeting, soldiers relaying information for situational 
awareness on the battlefield, and emergency disaster 
relief personnel coordinating efforts after a hurricane or 
An Efficient Secure Message Transmission in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks using Enhanced Homomorphic 
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earthquake. In such networks, each mobile node 
operates not only as a host but also as a router and 
cooperates dynamically to establish routing among 
them to discover “multihop” paths through the network 
to any other node. 
There are various issues related to ad hoc 
networks [5], [6]. Several protocols have been proposed 
for routing in such an environment. 
A Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is a 
collection of mobile nodes (hosts) which communicate 
with each other via wireless links either directly or relying 
on other nodes as routers. The operation of MANETs 
does not depend on preexisting infrastructure or base 
stations. Network nodes in MANETs are free to move 
randomly. Therefore, the network topology of a MANET 
may change rapidly and unpredictably. All network 
activities, such as discovering the topology and 
delivering data packets, have to be executed by the 
nodes themselves, either individually or collectively. 
Depending on its application, the structure of a MANET 
may vary from a small, static network that is highly 
power-constrained to a large-scale, mobile, highly 
dynamic network. 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) have been 
an area for active research over the past few years due 
to their potentially widespread application in military and 
civilian communications. Such a network is highly 
dependent on the cooperation of all of its members to 
perform networking functions. 
IV. Advantages of Manets 
The following are some of the advantages of 
mobile ad hoc networks. 
i. They provide access to information and service 
regardless of geographic position. This is applicable 
in military or police exercises, disaster relief 
operations, mine site operations, and urgent 
business meetings, where instant communication is 
needed. 
ii. These networks can be setup at any place and time. 
They can be setup without wires or base stations 
and the nodes are free to move randomly and 
organize themselves arbitrarily; thus the networks 
wireless topology may change rapidly and 
unpredictably. Mobile devices in the network can 
freely leave or join the network at will. 
iii. The networks work without any preexisting 
infrastructure. This makes MANETs cost effective for 
areas where there are no standard communication 
infrastructures. Owners of MANET equipped 
devices can communicate with each other, share 
data and streaming video. 
iv. Low Power Consumption is another strong point for 
MANETs. Most devices used are battery powered; 
hence they are portable, making mobility easy and 
 
  
V.
 
Challenges of Mobile Ad- oc 
Networks
 
Some challenges mobile ad hoc
 
networks face 
towards efficient delivery
 
of service includes:
 
a)
 
Routing is a Most 
 
Required function
 
in any network. In ad hoc 
networks,
 
routing poses two specific challenges.
 
Firstly, 
routing in traditional networks
 
(examples: the Internet 
and cellular
 
networks) aims to quickly propagate
 
changes in topology or reach ability,
 
hence creating 
stable networks, while in
 
mobile ad hoc networks, the 
topology is
 
constantly changing and is deemed
 
unstable. Secondly, traditional routing
 
solutions rely on 
some form of
 
distributed routing databases, maintained
 
by the operators in either the networks
 
nodes or 
specialized management nodes.
 
In mobile ad hoc 
networks, nodes cannot
 
be assumed to have persistent 
data
 
storage, and they cannot always be
 
trusted 
[Hubaux, et al 2001].
 
b)
 
Mobility Management
  
A network
 
must manage the mobility of its
 
terminals, and therefore be able to locate
 
any of them. In 
particular, if a terminal
 
wants to communicate with
 
another, it
 
will make use of the address of the latter;
 
the 
network will have to locate it in
 
some way. The simple 
solution of
 
broadcasting a paging message to the
 
whole 
network does not scale. For
 
example, in cellular 
networks, the
 
location of the mobile
 
stations is stored
 
in 
centralized servers. The
 
self-organization of ad hoc 
networks
 
precludes the existence of such servers,
 
leading to mediate loss/trace of any
 
node once outside 
the range of the
 
immediate network.
 
c)
 
IP (Internet Protocol) Addresses
 
For small mobile ad hoc
 
networks,
 
addresses 
are allocated in the
 
traditional way, with an IP prefix
 
identifying the mobile ad hoc network.
 
For large-scale 
networks,
 
the topology
 
based
 
address allocation 
currently used
 
in the Internet may not be optimal. In
 
contrast, a node address should be
 
interpreted as a 
stable node identifier,
 
which carries no specific 
topological
 
information.
 
d)
 
Transport Layer 
 
Of ad hoc networks
 
also requires attention. 
Transmission and
 
Control Protocol (TCP) performance 
in
 
ad hoc networks may be severely
 
degraded, as TCP 
interprets losses as a
 
signal of congestion and this 
adversely
 
reduces its sending rate, whereas
 
wireless 
links may temporarily exhibit
 
high loss rates due to 
transmission errors
 
not related to congestion. 
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devices affordable. Examples are Bluetooth enables 
phones, laptops, palm tops, etc.
e) Radio Interface
This can be engineered in different ways, based 
on the requirements of a specific system. Issues to be 
taken into account include:
H
   
 
  
 
i.
 
The decrease in signal strength as the
 
square of the 
distance.
 
ii.
 
Some of the traditional multi-access
 
protocols used 
for wire line LANs
 
cannot be used; example: 
collision
 
detection is not appropriate because a
 
node is usually unable to listen while it
 
is 
transmitting.
 
iii.
 
Two terminals may
 
unknowingly interfere at a third 
one.
 
f)
 
Security
 
This is of critical
 
importance for most networks,
 
and
 
mobile ad hoc networks are no
 
exception. Several 
security features can
 
be required, such as availability of
 
service despite denial-of-service attacks,
 
confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication,
 
and non-repudiation.
 
Guaranteeing these features is a major
 
challenge.
 
g)
 
Power Management
 
Is almost
 
always a difficult issue in wireless
 
networks. In the case of ad hoc
 
networks, there are 
essentially two
 
concerns:
 
i.
 
Power has to be fine-tuned in order to
 
maximize the 
throughput of the network:
 
the higher the power, the
larger the
 
transmission ranges of the node, but also
 
the higher the interference from other
 
signals. 
Trade-off is obtained when there
 
is on average 
exactly one packet in
 
transit over each hop.
 
ii.
 
Since the nodes are usually
 
battery
 
operated,
 
it is 
important to
 
minimize their consumption. A typical
 
solution consists in turning the devices
 
to a sleep or 
idle mode whenever they
 
VI.
 
Existing Security Solutions 
Available in the Area MANETs
 
1.
 
Secure routing protocol
  
a)
 
Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)
 
[9, 10].
 
b)
 
Secure link state protocol
 
(SLSP) [11].
 
2.
 
Secure data forwarding
 
a)
 
Secure Message Transmission
 
(SMT) [12,13]
 
b)
 
Threshold Cryptography
 
(TC)
 
[14].
 
In detail we can see below.
 
a)
 
Secure routing protocol suggested for
 
MANETs 
(SRP)
 
There are various secure routing
 
protocols 
suggested for routing packets
 
in MANETs. One such 
routing protocol
 
is Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [9,
 
10]. In SRP, only the end nodes have to
 
be securely 
associated, with no need for
 
cryptographic operations at 
the
 
intermediate nodes. SRP provides one or
 
more
 
route 
replies, whose correctness is
 
verified by the route 
“geometry” itself,
 
while compromised and invalid routing
 
 
  
 
 
against attacks
 
that attempt to exhaust network and 
node
 
resources. Furthermore, SLSP can
 
operate with 
minimal or no interactions
 
with a key management 
entity, while the
 
credentials of only a subset of network
 
nodes are necessary for each node to
 
validate the 
connectivity information
 
provided by its peers.
 
b)
 
Secure Data Forwarding Suggested for
 
MANETs
 
We will see two major secure message
 
transmission schemes such as Secure
 
Message 
Transmission and Threshold
 
Cryptography.
 
c)
 
Secure Message Transmission
 
Secure routing is the pre-requisite for
 
implementing secure data forwarding.
 
The main concept 
here is forwarding
 
data securily in MANETs in the
 
presence of malicious /untrusted nodes
 
after the 
discovering the route between
 
the source and target. 
There are various
 
schemes with various factors 
proposed
 
for secure data forwarding such as data
 
forwarding based on neighbor’s rating,
 
implementing 
currency system in
 
network for packet exchange, and
 
redundantly dividing and routing
 
message over multiple 
network routes.
 
For example, Secure Message
 
Transmission (SMT) is a secure data
 
forwarding scheme 
in which first the
 
active paths are discovered between 
two
 
nodes using secure routing protocol.
 
Based on B 
active
 
paths, the message is
 
divided into B different 
parts such that
 
any A parts can be used to recover this
 
message. These B partial messages are
 
then routed on 
the identified paths. The
 
destination can recover a 
message when
 
A or more partial messages are 
received.
 
Thus, this scheme ensures that the
 
message 
reaches the destination even if a
 
few packets are 
dropped in transit. Both
 
the above security solutions are 
essential
 
to ensure that the MANETs survive even
 
in the 
presence of malicious or untrusted
 
nodes. Thus, by 
implementing the above
 
solutions the nodes can 
communicate
 
securely without relying on all nodes on
 
only one route.
 
The concept of dividing
 
the message 
using SMT protocol is
 
extended further in the Threshold
 
Cryptography can be implemented to
 
redundantly 
fragment the message into B
 
parts such that using any 
T parts the
 
message can be recovered [12, 13,
 
14].
 
Now 
we will see in detail about the
 
this.
 
d)
 
Threshold Cryptography
 
The main goal of threshold
 
cryptography (TC) is 
to split a
 
cryptographic operation among multiple
 
users 
so that some predetermined
 
number of users can 
perform the desired
 
(cryptographic) operation. In
 
organizations, many security-related
 
actions are taken 
by a group of people
 
instead of an individual
 
so there is 
a need for guaranteeing the
 
authenticity of messages 
An Efficient Secure Message Transmission in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks using Enhanced Homomorphic 
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secure link state protocol (SLSP) [11] for MANETs. It
uses the secure neighbor discovery and the use of 
neighbor lookup protocol (NLP) strengthens SLSP 
sent by a group of individuals to another group without
expansion of keys and/or messages. To avoid a key 
management problem and to allow distribution of 
power, an organization should have one public key.
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The power to sign should then be shared,
 
to 
avoid abuse and to guarantee
 
reliability. Main aim of TC 
is to make
 
this possible. Both the schemes
 
ECC and
 
RSA are homomorphic. Therefore,
 
threshold 
cryptography is applicable and
 
cryptographic 
operations can be split
 
among multiple users such that 
any
 
subset comprising of t users can perform
 
the 
desired operation, where t is a
 
predefined number. In a t 
out of n
 
scheme, any set of t users can perform
 
the 
desired operation, while any set of (t-1) users or less 
cannot. A cryptographic
 
scheme based on threshold 
cryptography
 
is secure against an attacker as long as
 
the attacker compromises no more than
 
(t-1) nodes.
 
Threshold cryptography (TC) [13, 14,
 
15] 
involves sharing of a key by multiple
 
individuals called 
shareholders engaged
 
in encryption/decryption. The 
aim of this
 
is to have distributed architecture in a
 
hostile 
environment. Other than sharing
 
keys or working in 
distributed manner,
 
TC can be implemented to 
redundantly
 
split the message into B parts such that
 
with T or more pieces the original
 
message can be 
recovered. This ensures
 
secure message transmission 
between
 
two nodes over B multiple paths.
 
Threshold 
schemes generally involve
 
key generation, encryption, 
share
 
generation, share verification, and share
 
combining algorithms. The basic
 
requirement of any TC 
scheme is
 
Share
 
generation, for data confidentiality and
 
integrity. Threshold models can be
 
broadly divided into 
two major First one
 
is single secret sharing threshold 
e.g.
 
Shamir’s t-out-of-n scheme based on
 
Lagrange’s 
interpolation and later one is
 
threshold sharing functions 
e.g.
 
geometric based threshold. These
 
schemes are 
being used to implement
 
threshold variants of RSA,
 
ElGamal,ECC and Privacy
 
Homomorphism[13, 14].
 
RSA-TC and ECC-TC has been
 
discussed in the papers 
[13, 14, 15]. It
 
has been shown that RSA-TC using key
 
sharing is unsuitable in resource
 
constrained MANETs 
due to high
 
storage, computation, and bandwidth
 
requirements [13].
 
ECC-TC has been shown to be more
 
efficient 
for resource constrained
 
MANETs [14]. The authours in 
paper
 
[14] has used variation of ECC
 
implemented 
algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman (DH), Menezes 
Vanstone (MV)
 
and L Ertaul in MANETs. They have
 
performed various comparison tests in
 
different 
scenarios between these
 
different ECCs'. ECC-DH split 
before
 
encryption has been proved to be better
 
for 
resource constraint sender as the
 
encryption timings are 
lowest. ECC-MV
 
split before encryption has been 
proved
 
to be best for decryption at the resource
 
constraint receiver as the decryption
 
time is lowest. The 
encryption and
 
decryption time of ECC-
 
MV and ECCDH
 
has been shown to vary significantly
 
for encryption 
before split and
 
encryption after split. The encryption
 
and decryption time of ECC-Ertaul has
 
been proved to 
be more moderate for
 
varying key sizes, T and B for 
both
 
encryption before split and encryption
 
after split. As 
a result ECC-Ertaul has
 
been suggested as a best 
variation of
 
ECC for MANETs in his experiment
 
results 
[14].
 
We will show by our observations in our
 
experiments how our Enhanced
 
homomorphic 
encryption scheme can be
 
used as an alternative for TC 
for
 
performing the transmission the message
 
securely in 
MANETs in the next section.
 
e)
 
MANETs –
 
New Protocol by
 
Implementing EHES
 
In ECC based TC there is an overhead of
 
message splitting using Lagrange
 
Interpolation scheme. 
In our new scheme
 
keeping the concept of threshold
 
cryptography in mind, the message can
 
be split and 
encrypt by the our Enhanced
 
homomorphic encryption 
scheme
 
removing the overhead discussed above
 
by 
Lagrange Interpolation all together.
 
In our scheme we 
increase the success
 
rate as compared to RSA based 
TC. In
 
our study we used the Elgamal,
 
MMH
 
along with 
our Enhanced Homomorphic
 
encryption scheme to 
encrypt the
 
message.
 
We also tested their encryption
 
times and execution times.
 
Here we will discuss about 
our new
 
protocol to transmit the encrypted
 
message 
securely by using our Enhanced
 
homomorphic 
encryption schemes. We
 
show that even if a node is
 
compromised, the node will not be able
 
to determine the 
sensitive information.
 
Even if certain number of nodes 
are
 
compromised and not send the message,
 
the 
destination can recover the message.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure
 
1 :
 
New Protocol in MANETs
 
In our protocol we are only interested in
 
secured 
message transmission securely
 
on the already 
established path not in
 
path establishment from the 
sender to the
 
receiver. We assume that set of disjoint
 
paths and the key (using any of the key
 
distribution 
schemes.) have already been established from the
 
sender to receiver by MANETs routing
 
protocols [9, 10] 
between the sender and
 
receiver.
 
To transmit the message securely, the
 
idea is to 
group the set of n disjoint paths
 
from sender to receiver 
into g groups,
 
each group having at least n/g active
 
disjoint paths. The message to be
 
transmitted is split 
into number of
 
messages equal to g and encrypted 
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using homomorphic encryption schemes [2,3,4,5]. The 
encrypted split message is sent to each of the g groups 
so that the each group having only one encrypted split 
message. Each node (router) in the group also will have 
  
 
  
 
the same split
 
message and the entire message cannot
 
get even if node compromised. As
 
Homomorphic 
encryption schemes are
 
used to encrypt the split 
message, by
 
performing addition operation on the
 
encrypted split messages the receiver
 
can recover the 
entire encrypted message
 
and decryption the entire 
recovered
 
message. This scheme is illustrated in
 
the 
Figure 5.1.
 
As we know, the nodes are always on
 
the move 
in MAMETs. There will be
 
scenarios where the 
intermediate node is
 
out of range or may have been 
killed or
 
out of the MANET all together. In such
 
cases 
how would the receiver get all the
 
split messages sent 
by the sender? It is
 
the serious question. To ensure that 
the
 
receiver gets all the split messages, the
 
sender 
sends the same split messages to
 
more than one 
disjoint paths. Let us
 
assume that there are n disjoint 
paths and
 
the disjoint paths getting the same split
 
message belongs to one group. Let us
 
assume that 
there are g groups of disjoint
 
path, with each group 
having at least n/g
 
disjoint paths. The sender splits a
 
message into g splits, and sends each
 
split to each 
group. The receiver
 
recovers the entire message even if 
at
 
most
 
(n/g)-1 disjoint paths are not active.
 
A malicious 
node cannot recover the
 
entire message as it gets only 
partial
 
encrypted message. To ensure security
 
the 
sender does not send more than one
 
split message to 
the same group of
 
nodes.
 
f)
 
Secure data forwarding protocol with
 
EHES 
implementation results
 
We simulated the MANETs environment
 
using 
the programming language
 
C in
 
the Linix environment. It 
is done on a
 
system having the Intel® Core™ 2 Duo
 
CPU T5750@2GHz CPU and 3 GB
 
system memory 
running the Linux
 
kernel –2.6.25-14.fc9.i686 Fedora
 
release -9.
  
The assumptions during implementation
 
are 
that there is a sender, receiver and
 
multiple forwarding 
nodes between
 
them
 
and set of active disjoint paths 
have
 
already been established from the sender
 
to 
receiver by the routing protocols. We
 
also assume that 
the key for
 
homomorphic encryption scheme has
 
already been established between the
 
sender and 
receiver by using any of the
 
key distribution schemes. 
The
 
Homomorphic encryption scheme used
 
to encrypt 
the message at the sender are
 
Enhanced Homomorphic 
encryption
 
scheme, Mixed multiplicative
 
homomorphism 
and Elgamal.
 
Using our simulation system, We have
 
tested all the schemes processing timing
 
encryption 
timings.
 
Here we also tested
 
the following scenarios
 
1.
 
By varying key sizes 512,
 
1024
 
and 2048 bits by 
keeping the
 
message size fixed.
 
    
    
 
 
3.
 
By varying d (splitting times)
 
size 2,4,6,8,10 to find 
the best d
 
value in the Network as the d is
 
based on 
number of groups.
 
4.
 
Here we have considered the
 
following two
  
−
 
First one, encryption done after
 
the splitting the 
message.
 
−
 
Second one, Encryption done
 
first and then split the 
message.
 
In our simulation the active disjoint
 
paths getting 
the same message are
 
grouped as one group. Based 
on n active
 
paths the groups g are determined. The
 
sender splits the message and encrypts
 
each split 
message with the one of the
 
homomorphic encryption 
schemes. In
 
our network, n and g are fixed to
 
(12,{2,6,12}), (16,{2,8,16}) and
 
(24,{2,12,24}). The 
proposed network
 
rate of success is computed as ( No. 
of
 
recovered messages by the receiver/No.
 
of sender 
sent message s) * 100 …
 
(5.1)
 
The rate of success of 
the network with n
 
and g fixed to (12,{2,6,12}),
 
(16,{2,8,16}) and (24,{2,12,24}) is
 
determined by 
randomly killing the
 
nodes. The nodes are killed 
randomly by
 
using Exponential distribution provided
 
by 
the function in GSL library [41].
  
In our implementation, the
 
sender first splits the 
message into g
 
partial messages where each partial
 
message is sent to one of the g groups of
 
the MANETs. 
Each of the partial
 
messages are associated with a 
unique
 
message split id. All the message split
 
id’s of the 
partial messages forming the
 
entire message is 
summed up to set up
 
the message split id sum. The 
message
 
id, message split id, message spit id sum
 
and 
encrypted partial text is placed in the
 
buffer so that the 
receiver can recover
 
the entire message from the partial
 
encrypted message. To recover the entire
 
message sent 
by the sender, the receiver
 
follows two steps. In the first 
step the
 
receiver adds up all the partial
 
encrypted
 
message whose message id’s are same
 
and message 
split id’s sums up to
 
message split id sum. In the 
second step
 
the receiver decrypts the sum of all
 
partial 
encrypted messages to recover
 
the entire message. As 
the same
 
encrypted partial message is sent to all
 
the 
active paths in the group the receiver
 
is likely to get the 
same redundant
 
message. The redundant messages 
will
 
be discarded by the receiver if they have
 
the same 
message id and message split
 
id.
 
In the next section we 
look at the
 
encrypted message buffer structure.
 
g)
 
The encrypted message buffer
 
structure
 
The size of the encrypted message buffer
 
structure sent form sender to receiver
 
varies from one 
homomorphic
 
encryption to another.
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2. By varying message sizes 500, 1000, 2000 bits as 
on stream and 100, 250, 500 bits as in another 
streams with fixed key size ( 512,1024 and 2048 
bits).
h) Elgamal
In elgamal the size of the cipher text increases
with the increase in the encryption split “d”. So the size 
of the buffer increases with the increase of the
parameter d used in encryption.
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i)
 
Mixed Multiplicative Homomorphism
 
(MMH)
 
Here also the size of the ciphertext
 
increases 
with the increase in the
 
encryption split “d”. So the size 
of the
 
buffer increases with the increase of the
 
parameter d used in encryption.
 
j)
 
Enhanced Homomorphic Encryption
 
Scheme 
(EHES)
 
In all the above mentioned schemes the
 
message id field identifies different
 
messages encrypted 
at
 
the sender. The
 
messages split at the sender is 
uniquely
 
identified by message split id. The sum
 
of all 
the message split id is included in
 
message split id sum. 
The rest of the
 
buffer is used to contain the size of the
 
ciphertext and the ciphertext itself. The
 
size of the 
ciphertext is essential in
 
reading the ciphertext from the 
buffer.
 
The receiver recovers the entire message
 
by 
adding up all the cipher values with
 
the same message 
id and whose message
 
split id’s adds up to message 
split id
 
sum.
 
k)
 
Experimental Investigations
 
We will see the performance results
 
from our 
simulation.
 
 
In MANETs as we know that the nodes
 
have 
low computational power, Less
 
memory. In such cases 
we need to find
 
best encryption scheme, which can
 
compute fastly and occupies less
 
memory. In our 
implementation we do
 
various tests to find a relatively 
best
 
encryption schemes among our
 
scheme,
 
Elgamal,
 
MMH.
 
In our simulation we tested and
 
determined the 
encryption timings of all
 
above mentioned encryption 
schemes by
 
varying the key size (512, 1024, 2048
 
bits) 
and keeping the message size fixed
 
(512 bits). In 
another test we
 
determined the execution timings of all
 
these same encryption schemes by
 
keeping the key size 
fixed (512 bits,
 
1024 bits, 2048 bits) and varying
 
message size. The timings are
 
determined over 200 
runs.
 
Figure 1 represents the execution
 
timings of 
Table 1 in a chart. From
 
Figure 1, by observation we 
found
 
clearly that our Scheme is much faster
 
than other 
encryption schemes. We also
 
observed that the 
encryption timings of
 
Scheme MMH and Elgamal 
increases
 
with the increase in encryption keys but
 
in 
case of our Scheme the encryption
 
timing remains 
almost the same with the
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1
 
:
 
Encryption process time of
 
Schemes µSec
 
with 
key size 512 bit
 
increase in the encryption key
 
size
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1
 
:
 
Processing time of Schemes
 
in micro seconds 
with varying key
 
sizes and fixed message size 512 bits
 
Table 1 represents the execution timing
 
of 
above mentioned schemes in micro
 
seconds by 
increasing the message size
 
to 100, 250 and 500 bits 
and by keeping
 
the key size fixed (512 bits). Figure 1
 
graph represents the execution timings
 
of Table 1. From 
Figure 2, it is very
 
clear that our Scheme is much faster
 
than other two Schemes. We also found
 
that the 
encryption timing of other
 
Schemes increases with the 
increase in
 
message size we also observed that the
 
Message size
 
encryption timings of our Scheme
 
remains almost the same with the
 
increase in the 
message size.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure
 
2
 
:
 
Encryption process time of
 
Schemes in Sec 
with key size 512 bit
 
Table 3 represents the execution timings
 
of the 
same encryption schemes in micro
 
seconds by 
increasing the message size (250, 500 and 1000 bits ) 
and by keeping
 
the key size fixed ( 1024
 
bits ). Figure 3
 
graph represents the execution timings
 
of Table 37.. 
From Figure 5.4, we can
 
say that our Scheme is much 
faster than
 
other schemes. We also observed that
 
the 
encryption timings of Elgamal
 
increases with the 
increase in message
 
size and the encryption timings of 
our
 
Scheme and MMH remains almost the
 
same with 
the increase in the message
 
size.
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Processing  time
0
50
100
150
200
250
512 1024 2048
Ke y  si z e  i n bi t s
Elgamal
MMH
EHES
Message size 
in bits 
Elgamal MMH  EHES 
250 89 21 9 
500 105 21 11 
1000 142 22 8 
µ
Figure 3 : Processing time of schemes in µSec at 1024 
bit key size
 
 
 
 
    
 
Table 3
 
:
 
Processing time of schemes
 
in µSec
 
at 1024 
bit key size
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We
 
have also computed the execution
 
timings 
of Schemes in micro seconds
 
by increasing the 
message size (500,
 
1000 and 2000 bits) and by keeping 
the
 
key size fixed (2048 bits). graph 4
 
shows the 
execution timings computed,
 
it is observed that our 
Scheme is much
 
faster than other schemes as shown in
 
chart and that the encryption timings of
 
Elgamal 
Schemes increases with the
 
increase in message size 
and the
 
encryption timings of our Scheme and
 
MMH 
remains almost the same with the
 
increase in the 
message size.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4
 
:
 
Processing time of schemes
 
in µSec
 
at key 
size 2048 bit
 
From the graphs and corresponding
 
Tables it is
 
observed that our Scheme is
 
much faster than other 
schemes. We
 
also observed from graph (Figure 2) that
 
the encryption timings of other
 
Schemes
 
increases with 
the increase in encryption
 
keys but the encryption timing 
of our
 
Scheme remains almost the same with
 
the 
increase in the encryption key size.
 
From graphs and 
corresponding Tables
 
we also can say that the 
encryption
 
timings of Elgamal Scheme increases
 
with 
the increase in message size.
 
However the encryption   
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
the networks with n active
 
paths and g groups fixed to 
(12,{2,6,12}), (16,{2,8,16}) and (24,{2,12,24}), by 
randomly killing the nodes. The nodes in the networks 
are killed randomly by using Exponential distribution 
provided by the function in GSL library [41]. 
The networks with n and g fixed to (12,{2,6,12}) 
defines 3 sets of networks with the I network having 12
 
active paths, 2 groups and 6 active paths in each group, 
II network with 12 active paths, 6 groups and 2 active 
paths in each group and III network with 12 active paths, 
12 groups and 1 active path in each group. The 
networks with n and g fixed to (16,{2,8,16}) defines 3 
sets of networks with I network having 16 active paths, 2 
groups and 8 active paths in one group and 8 active 
paths in another group, II network with 16 active paths, 8 
groups and 2 active paths in one group and 2 active 
paths in remaining groups and III network with 16 active 
paths, 16 groups and 1 active path in each group. The 
networks with n and g fixed to (24,{2,12,24}) defines 3 
sets of networks with I network having 24 active paths, 2 
groups and 12 active paths in each group, II network 
with 24 active paths, 12 groups and 2 active paths in 
each group and III network with 12
 
active paths, 24 
groups and 1 active path in each group. From graph 
shown in the Figure 5.7 it is clear that the rate of 
success increases by reducing the number of groups in 
the network. This is because by reducing the number of 
groups in the network we would increase the number of 
active paths in each group. Just one partial message 
from each group is enough to recover the entire 
message. From Figure 5.7
 
we see that the rate of 
success is 100% with g=2
 
and
 
n=12,16,24. This is 
because by increasing the number of paths in each 
group, the probability of one path in each group 
remaining active is high and with it the probability of 
recovery of the message at the receiver is also high. The 
rate of success gradually decreases with the gradual 
increase in the number of groups in the network. With 
g=n
 
we see that rate of success is lesser than 50%. 
Therefore to get the rate of success as 100% in the 
network it is better to reduce the number of groups, thus 
increasing the number of active paths in each group. 
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SIZE IN 
BITS 
Elgamal
Our 
Scheme 
EHES 
100 72 11 7 
250 76 11 7 
500 87 11 7 
MMH
 
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
III
 I
ss
ue
 I
X
 V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
 
(
DD DD DDDD
)
E
timings of MMH and our Schemes remains almost the 
same with the increase in the message size.
l) Experimental Results of our New Protocol with our 
new scheme
In MANETs we know that the nodes are always 
on the move and there may be scenarios where the
active path may no longer be active with this result, the
receiver may not receive all the packets sent by the 
0
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Figure 5 : Rate of success of the I,II & III Network
 Processing  time of schemes in 
micro Sec at key size 2048 bit
0
500
Message size in bits
Ti
m
e 
in
 
µS
ec
 
 
 
.
500 1000 2000
500 216 47 11
1000 291 47 10
2000 402 47 12
Elgam MMH EHES
sender. Figure 5 graph depicts the rate of success of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure
 
6
 
:
 
Processing timing ( in micro
 
seconds ) of our 
Scheme and MMH
 
in micro Seconds varying key sizes
 
512,
 
1024 & 2048
 
Table 4
 
:
 
Processing timing of our
 
Scheme and MMH in 
micro Seconds
 
varying key sizes 512,
 
1024 & 2048
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our proposed protocol in MANETs
 
the sender 
splits the message with
 
respect to the value g. The 
sender using
 
the homomorphic encryption scheme
 
then 
encrypts all the split messages. As
 
the number of splits 
at the sender is
 
equal to the value g the total encryption 
timing of all the split messages increase
 
with the value 
g. Figure 5.7 & 5.8 and the corresponding Tables 
represent the
 
total encryption timings of all the split
 
messages. From the Figures it is observed that the total 
encryption timing
 
increases with the value g. Also from 
Figures we found that our Scheme is the much fastest 
encryption scheme,
 
followed by other Schemes. 
 
VII.
 Discussion of Results 
By using our proposed new scheme for secured 
transmission of message in the area MANETs as an 
alternative to TC, we eliminate the overhead of the 
schemes associated with Lagrange Interpolation 
Scheme. As MANETs are
 
grouped mode even if one 
compromised
 
the entire message would not be
 
revealed. For this the attacker needs to
 
compromise 
atleast g nodes to get full
 
message for that he
 
has to get 
one node
 
from each group g and know the
 
encryption 
keys to decrypt the message.
 
The success rate of our 
proposed new
 
scheme is 100% if there are more
 
number of active paths in each group of the network. 
From our implementation results it is clear that our 
scheme is the fastest homomorphic encryption scheme 
in comparison with other schemes. 
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